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Abstract 
 
In reaction to modern protectionism, the European Union has reshaped its trade 
policy based on the principles of partnership and prioritisation. With the Market 
Access Partnership it has formalised a new diplomatic trade tool in third countries: 
the Market Access Teams. These teams are networks with multiple stakeholders and 
they are acting in a decentralised manner in the respective host countries. The 
various Market Access Teams created worldwide since 2007 underline the growing 
interest from the EU, Member States and businesses in offensive trade policy 
instruments. These instruments should be directed at opening foreign markets and 
eliminating obstacles to trade for European exporters. This paper analyses under 
what conditions Market Access Teams can effectively remove non-tariff barriers to 
trade (NTBs) for European exports in third countries. It focuses on non-tariff barriers for 
the European pharmaceutical industry in three Asian countries (Philippines, Indonesia 
and Japan). Pharmaceutical products are truly global products which are easy to 
transport and confronted by global competition and they heavily rely on European 
intellectual property rights knowledge. I argue that Market Access Teams in their 
composition and function are an adequate translation of the Commission’s strategic 
ambition to deliver more tangible results for European exporters through offensive 
trade policy. A Market Access Team is likely to be more successful, the greater the 
cohesiveness of its members, the more salient a non-tariff barrier to trade for the 
European Commission and the less salient that NTB in the host country. The study 
draws on trade literature, news sources, questionnaires and interviews.  
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1. Introduction: Improving Market Access Abroad 
 
"The European Union will continue to show leadership on global trade and stand firm 
against protectionism. We need this commitment more than ever to promote trade 
and overcome the economic downturn. We are committed to multilateralism, to 
transparency, and to open markets based on rules that benefit developed and 
developing countries alike."1  
Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton  
 
In the current climate of financial and economic crisis, declining output and 
diminishing demand, protectionist policies appear as tempting measures to keep 
domestic economies running. Non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) such as technical 
standards and regulations, licensing constraints or subsidies to domestic 
manufacturing are more difficult to identify and even more difficult to tackle. The 
European Union (EU) is estimated to be losing orders worth 20 billion euro per year in 
China only because of these ‘behind-the-border barriers’.2 An important trade 
barrier is the insufficient protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), and the 
reliance on the protection of research and development investments is especially 
high for one European key sector, the pharmaceutical industry. However, the fight 
against protectionism for this strategic sector in developing countries is especially 
sensitive as it touches not only upon the question of market access but also upon the 
question of access to medicines at affordable prices.  
The fact that the Doha Development Round in 2008 grinded to a halt 
underlines that the successful conclusion of multilateral agreements on trade 
liberalisation becomes more complicated to achieve due to new issues, more actors 
and different trade patterns.3 The EU has attempted to address this problem 
especially in its Market Access Strategy of 2007. In the document, the European 
Commission puts forward the concept of a Market Access Partnership.4 Its main 
characteristics are the openness to all stakeholders and the prioritisation on key 
                                                 
1 C .  A s h t o n ,  " W T O  p r a i s e s  E U ’ s  s t a n c e  o n  m u ltilateral trade and support for developing 
countries", RAPID Press Release, 6 April 2009, Brussels, retrieved 30 April 2009, http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/544&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en. 
2 M. Koch, "Spürtrupps nach China", Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 April 2007, retrieved 17 March 
2009, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/796/349631/text. 
3 Cf. B. Hocking, "Beyond Seattle: Adapting the Trade Policy Process", in B. Hocking and S. 
McGuire (eds.), Trade Policy, Routledge, London, 1999(2nd edn.), p. 264. 
4 Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Global Europe: A Stronger Partnership 
to Deliver Market Access for European Exporters (Market Access Strategy), COM(2007) 183 
final, 18 April 2007, Brussels, p. 2. 
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markets and sectors. The Market Access Partnership has an institutional set-up within 
the EU and another in form of the Market Access Team (MAT) outside the EU in third 
countries. The MATs are trade diplomatic networks that have been created to target 
specific NTBs.  
This study seeks to explore under which conditions Market Access Teams 
succeed in removing NTBs for the European pharmaceutical industry in Japan, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. I argue that the composition and function of MATs can 
make it an effective tool for the Commission’s strategic ambition to “deliver real 
economic benefits for its Member States and European citizen and businesses”.5 
However, their actual influence remains dependent on specific conditions. Four 
hypotheses are developed to analyse these conditions of the MATs’ influence on the 
removal of trade barriers abroad. More precisely, I argue that successful offensive 
trade policy through MATs depends on (1) internal factors such as the organisation 
and membership of the MAT and on (2) external factors such as the salience of the 
NTB in the EU as well as in the third country.  
The three countries selected for the case studies share four main 
characteristics but vary with regard to the domestic influence of the MATs. First, all 
cases are located in Asia, which is one of the priorities of the Global Europe 
strategy.6 Second, Indonesia and the Philippines offer further growth perspectives for 
European companies, especially in the sector of pharmaceutical products, as former 
‘South-East Asian tigers’. Third, despite some initial negotiations since April 2007, the 
EU has neither concluded a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with these countries 
nor a regional free trade agreement with ASEAN; in addition to that, all countries are 
members of the WTO. Fourth, NTBs such as the violation of IPRs or technical standards 
and regulations affecting exporters and investors in these countries are unlikely to 
disappear in view of the rise of Asian markets.  
As Market Access Teams are a recent development, there is a lacuna of 
research on their internal structure, working procedures and impact. Therefore, 
primary empirical evidence had to be obtained for this study. For this purpose, I sent 
questionnaires to all participants in these teams in the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Japan. After general questions on the number of participants, the duration of their 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 14. 
6 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Global Europe: Competing in the World. A contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs 
Strategy, COM(2006) 567final, Brussels, 4 October 2006, p. 9.  
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cooperation and the trade barrier targeted, the participants were asked to carry out 
a self-assessment within different issue areas. First, they had to evaluate the strengths 
of their MAT regarding its resources, information exchange and potential veto-
players. Second, the participants had to assess the relationship with foreign or local 
trade associations and finally their status in the host country of their respective MAT. 
The questionnaire was sent out to all participants of MATs in the three countries of the 
case studies. Answers were received from different categories of stakeholders for 
each case study and the response rate was beyond 20%. In addition, interviews 
have provided valuable insights into the working procedures of the MATs.  
The paper is divided into two sections. In the first section, the Market Access 
Partnership and its particular tool of MATs will be introduced and the strategies and 
conceptual innovations on which the Market Access Partnership is based will be 
outlined. The second section presents the empirical case studies of MATs in the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Japan and concludes with an overall assessment of the 
results in the light of theoretically derived hypotheses. Finally, the conclusions will offer 
further policy insights for the future development of the MATs. 
 
2. Innovation in EU Trade Policy: A New Instrument  
 
2.1 The Strategy: Partnership and Prioritisation 
 
Despite the fact that the Common Commercial Policy is “one of the EU’s biggest 
success stories”,7 foreign governments’ use of protectionist policies such as non-tariff 
barriers to trade limits the EU’s trade power. These “politics of ‘second-generation’ 
trade policy”8 are often entangled with domestic policies. Consequently, these 
barriers are particularly sensitive, complex and difficult to identify. A salient example 
is the infringement of intellectual property rights in the area of public health systems. 
This sector is a particularly “strategic sector for Europe”9 because of its contribution 
to health, growth and employment. Therefore, a key challenge for EU trade policy 
                                                 
7 European Commission, Commission staff working document, accompanying document to 
Global Europe: a Stronger Partnership to Deliver Market Access for European Exporters – 
Impact Assessment, COM(2007) 183 final, SEC(2007) 453, SEC/2007/0452, Brussels, 18 April 
2007, p. 5.  
8 OECD, Globalisation and Emerging Economies: Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and 
South Africa, Paris, 2008, p. 158. 
9 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions,  Safe, Innovative and Accessible Medicines: a Renewed Vision for the Pharma-
ceutical Sector, COM(2008) 666, Brussels, 10 December 2008, p. 3.  
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efforts remains to achieve a “condition of competition provid[ing] foreign goods, 
services, service providers and investors opportunities to compete in a market on 
terms equal or comparable to those enjoyed by locally produced goods and 
services and locally established firms”.10  
The EU response to this challenge has developed under two key principles: 
partnership and prioritisation which are described in the renewed Lisbon Strategy 
(2008),11  Global Europe (2006)12 and the Market Access Strategy (2007).13 These 
documents shape the concept of Market Access Partnership. Already in 2005, the 
Communication Global Europe issued by the Commission marks a shift in EU external 
trade policy “away from an almost exclusive focus on multilateral rule-making”14 
towards a more active involvement of the EU in trade diplomacy with third countries. 
This new commitment is motivated by the EU's ambition to increase its competitive-
ness which relies on its own openness and on the “greater openness and fair rules in 
other markets, in particular future trading partners”.15  
This approach is shaped in the renewed Market Access Strategy of 2007 by 
addressing, on the one hand, prioritisation in terms of key markets and key 
instruments and, on the other hand, partnership with Member States and industry 
and/or exporters.16 These principles should help to provide “quicker [and] more 
responsive action”17 to meet the needs of EU stakeholders. The Market Access 
Partnership between the Commission, Member States and businesses/business 
associations has become one of the key innovations to enhance the EU’s external 
competitiveness. It is an umbrella term for a set of specific instruments and actions 
executed by committees, working bodies and networks which is unfolding on the 
                                                 
10 A.B. Zampetti and P. Sauvé, "New Dimensi o n s  o f  M a r k e t  A c c e s s :  A n  O v er vi ew " ,  i n  New 
Dimensions of Market Access in a Globalising World Economy, Paris, OECD, 1995, p. 15. 
11 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, On the External Dimension of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: Reporting on 
Market Access and Setting the Framework for more Effective International Regulatory 
Cooperation, COM(2008) 874 final, Brussels, 16 December 2008, p. 14.  
12 European Commission, COM(2006) 567 final, op.cit., p. 3. 
13 European Commission, COM(2007) 183 final, op.cit., p. 2. 
14 S. Evenett, "‘Global Europe’: An Initial Assessment of the European Commission’s New Trade 
Policy", January 2007, Aussenwirtschaft, p. 3, retrieved 1 April 2009, http://www.evenett.com/ 
research/articles/ECNewTradePol.pdf.  
15 European Commission, COM(2006) 567 final, op.cit., p. 3.  
16 Ibid., p. 11.  
17 Ibid., p. 9. 
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diplomatic or political level, addressing barriers through the preparation of free trade 
agreements, bilateral negotiations, regulatory dialogue and trade diplomacy.18  
What is the innovation of trade diplomacy within the Market Access 
Partnership? Saner and Liu define trade diplomatic efforts as either led by the state 
or by the company, two actors which pursue distinctive categories of trade 
diplomacy in different arenas with different objectives.19 The Market Access 
Partnership exceeds the concepts of state-state, state-firm or firm-firm diplomatic 
relations put forward by Susan Strange20 and is closer to the concept of formalised 
cooperation between multiple stakeholders o n  e q u a l  g r o u n d s .  I t  i s  ‘ j o i n t  t r a d e  
diplomacy’ or ‘diplomacy open to multiple stakeholders’  in which each actor is 
urged to invest its assets into a coordinated effort for the same objective of trade 
barrier removal. Therefore, it becomes comparable with a “networking mode of 
activity and [is] less hierarchical in both its structures and processes”.21  
Due to its innovative characteristics, Market Access Partnership diplomacy 
provides new answers to the specific challenge of changing trade patterns in the 
21st century. First, the Market Access Partnership can offer additional access for 
business and civil society to trade policy and it can therefore actively promote their 
involvement in trade diplomacy. Second, the Market Access Partnership brings 
together actors with complementary sets of knowledge. Therefore, it promotes 
synergies in coordinating resources spent on identification of trade barriers.  
 
2.2 The Structure of the Market Access Partnership 
 
The Market Access Partnership as one of the key principles of the Market Access 
Strategy has two characteristics. First, several stakeholders are convened and 
second, its internal structure is mirrored in an external set-up which are the MATs.  
Actors from different levels are gathered as stakeholders of the Market Access 
Partnership. From the European side, Commission officials from DG Trade, DG 
Enterprise and DG Relex are part of the network, whereas the Commission 
Delegations in third countries form part of the external structure. Member States are 
                                                 
18 C. Ashton, "Remarks at the Market Access symposium ‘Opening Borders to Business’", 27 
November 2008, Paris, p. 2, retrieved 12 April 2008, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2008/December/tradoc_141766.pdf. 
19 R. Saner and L. Yiu, "International Economic Diplomacy: Mutations in Post-modern Times", 
Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, The Hague, Clingendael, 2001, p. 13.  
20 Cf. S. Strange, "States, Firms and Diplomacy", International Affairs, vol. 68, no.1, 1992, p. 6. 
21 B. Hocking, op.cit., p. 267. 
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participating not only through the Council and their Economic Counsellors in the 
‘Article 133 Committee’ but also through their embassies in third countries. Finally, 
business is mostly represented through business associations. In some cases, the 
Market Access Partnership is also open for participation of representatives of civil 
society. In ideal circumstances, all stakeholders enumerated above act jointly 
through the committees and teams provided by the platform of the Market Access 
Partnership in order to detect, analyse and remove trade barriers in third countries 
(see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Participants in the Market Access Partnership22 
 
In this partnership, each stakeholder has been attributed a specific role according to 
its resources and expertise. In the hub of the Market Access Partnership the EU 
Commission acts as a platform for convening all actors. Moreover, it functions as 
interface between the concerned parties and the public. It takes the role of a 
coordinator of external stakeholders but it has also to coordinate different 
approaches towards trade diplomacy within the different DGs.  
The Market Access Partnership provides an institutional set-up for two 
playgrounds which are inside and outside the EU. Inside the EU, the Market Access 
Partnership is forged around the European Commission in Brussels, whereby DG Trade 
functions as driver for offensive market opening. In Brussels there are several 
committees and working groups in charge of opening markets. These are the Market 
Access Advisory Committee (MAAC), plus currently ten working groups, the ‘Article 
133 Committee’ as well as the European Parliament as additional advisor. The MAAC 
serves as "central nervous system"23 or “focal point for the coordination with Member 
                                                 
22 Modelled on European Commission (Martin Pilser), "The Market Access Strategy and its 
Implementation. Global Europe: a Stronger Partnership to Deliver Market Access for European 
Exporters", Market Access Unit, 25 June 2008, retrieved 3 April 2009, www.cebre.cz/ 
dokums_rwa/023_czech_business_representation_080625_2.  
23 European Commission, DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue, 15 April 2008, Brussels, retrieved 11 
April 2009, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/april/ tradoc_138560.pdf. 
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States and business”.24 The agenda for the monthly meetings is prepared in 
coordination with other stakeholders. The MAAC is relying on the technical expertise 
coming from the working groups, which work under its supervision. First created in 
2007, these working groups, organised alongside industries or countries, are seeking 
to “provide early warning on new measures, to provide technical analysis of the issue 
and to develop strategies for action”.25 From the companies’ or trade associations’ 
perspective, the ‘Article 133 Committee’ has a further important role within the 
Market Access Partnership. Through this partnership, member states’ economic 
counsellors become directly involved in MAAC meetings. Consequently, national 
representtatives can now directly report to business about important issues dealt with 
in the ‘Article 133 Committee’. 
The Market Access Partnership's inclusiveness also gave a fresh impetus to 
cooperation with other developed countries such as the US or Japan in the field of 
Market Access. Cooperation with the US in the framework of the Market Access 
Partnership was launched in 2006, and the EU-Japan Market Access Cooperation 
began in November 2007. This cooperation is usually initiated in fields where both 
partners share the same objectives.   
 
2.3 The External Instrument: Market Access Teams  
 
For external action, multiple stakeholders are organised in MATs which are the institu-
tional structure of the Market Access Partnership. These stakeholders are delegated 
from the Member States’ embassies, EC delegations, EU trade associations over even 
from local or other foreign trade associations or companies (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: The Mirror Structure of MAAC and MATs26 
                                                 
24 European Commission, Progress Report 2008, Trade/G/1/SL-D(2009) 1209, Brussels, 5 
February 2009, p. 4. 
25 Ibid., p. 5. 
26 European Commission (Martin Pilser), op.cit.  
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The MATs are flexible networks as they take into account specific challenges resulting 
from geographical location, the industry working with or the issue concerned. As ‘the 
eyes, ears and mouth of the EU’ in third countries, the MATs have 
-  an information function, which consists in information gathering and 
clustering, translating input from the MAAC and the ‘Art. 133 Committee’ and 
returning locally collected information to the Brussels-based institutions, 
-  a communication function, and  
-  a negotiation function with the host country.  
To date there are 31 MATs in 28 countries on five continents with 8 MATs in Asia 
(including China) and 6 MATs in South America. The majority of formalised MATs is 
concerned with IPRs and issues of sanitary or phytosanitary standards.27  
 
3. Framework of Analysis 
 
This study draws on two theoretical concepts in order to address the question under 
which conditions MATs may succeed in effectively removing NTBs in its host country. 
First, the organisational theory of networks is used in order to address the internal 
dimension of the MAT. Thereby the study seeks to analyse the composition of the 
MATs, the interdependence of actors as well as the type of cooperation. Networks 
are used as an analytical tool to categorise the relationships within the MATs as 
either cooperative or competitive. Second, the literature on lobbying of interest 
groups in the EU is used to explore the external dimension of the MAT, that is the 
MAT’s lobbying efforts in the host country. Research on lobbying in the EU has 
concentrated on formation, organisation, access and activities of lobbyists.28 In the 
specific literature on influence of lobbying, influence is understood as “control over 
political outcomes”,29 whereby the actual outcomes can be either the position 
declared by single politicians and governments or the implementation of that 
policy.30 Both the internal and external dimensions influence the overall performance 
of an MAT. Hence, the following four hypotheses address both dimensions. 
 
                                                 
27 Number referring to June 2009.  
28 C. Mahoney, "Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union", Journal of 
Public Policy, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 35. 
29 A. Dür and D. De Bièvre, "The Question of Interest Group Influence", in B. Kohler-Koch, D. De 
Bièvre and W. Maloney (eds.), Opening EU-Governance to Civil Society: Gains and 
Challenges, CONNEX, Mannheim, 2008, p. 28. 
30 Ibid. 
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1.  The greater the cohesiveness between MAT members over a longer period of 
time, and the more information and resources they share, the more likely the MAT 
succeeds in removing an NTB in its host country. 
 
The basic configuration of the MAT can comprise up to 27 Member States’ 
representatives, the Commission Delegation as well as various – European, bilateral 
and local or even foreign – trade associations. This large number of participants with 
often various cultural backgrounds poses the challenge of strict coordination and 
coherent action to the actors in the host country as underlined in the first yearly 
market access report.31 The first part of the hypothesis emphasises that a cohesive 
membership diminishes the risk of free-riding and enhances the cooperation 
between the stakeholders. According to McGuire, the cohesiveness of a lobbyist 
network over a long period constitutes even the prerequisite for any success.32 This 
hypothesis therefore looks explicitly at the continuity of participants in the meetings 
and the level of assessed trust by the participants. In addition, the second part of the 
hypothesis highlights one of the main assets of the Market Access Partnership, which 
is the multiplication of resources through a joint approach towards NTBs. This asset is 
reflected in the assumption that “groups with more resources should, ceteris paribus, 
have more influence than groups with little resources”.33  
 
2.  The more an NTB issue has become salient for the committees and working 
groups in the European Commission, the more resources are shifted to the 
respective MAT, thus making it more likely that the MAT succeeds in removing the 
NTB in its host country. 
 
3.  The less salient an NTB issue in the host country, the easier the MAT’s access to 
political decision-makers and the more likely the MAT succeeds in removing the 
NTB in its host country.  
 
This argument views politicians as rational actors who seek to raise their re-election 
prospects. It is one of the characteristics of the “second generation of trade-policy 
reforms”34 to be politically sensitive and to affect “entrenched interests that are 
                                                 
31 European Commission, , COM(2008) 874 final, op.cit., p. 14.  
32 S. McGuire, "Firms and Governments in International Trade", in B. Hocking and S. McGuire 
(eds.), Trade Policy, London, Routledge, 1999(2nd edn.), p. 279. 
33 Ibid. 
34 OECD, Globalisation and Emerging Economies: Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and 
South Africa, op.cit., p. 158. 
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extremely difficult to dislodge”.35  When an issue is salient, the legislator cannot 
disconnect from its electorate’s will without being most probably punished in the 
next elections.36 By the same token, the less salient the issue is, the easier for the 
respective legislator to take action for a removal. 
 
4.  The greater the involvement of local trade associations in the MAT, the more likely 
the MAT succeeds in removing an NTB in its host country. 
 
The literature on lobbying often evokes the role of countervailing forces.37 Their 
existence has consequences for the potential influence exerted by the initial 
lobbying group. In the case of MATs, local trade associations are assumed to be 
more protectionist. However, when local trade associations join the MAT, the MAT 
can enjoy further resources. As institutions of the host country, they do not face any 
cultural, linguistic or other specific problems to access domestic political decision-
makers. To the extent that the MATs are inclusive towards the active involvement of 
local trade associations or even other foreign trade associations (e.g. Australian 
trade associations or US trade promotion institutions), the MAT enjoys additional 
resources, which finally facilitate access to politicians in the host country. 
 
4. Case Studies: the MATs in the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan 
 
4.1 The Market Access Team in the Philippines 
 
The EU market access initiative in the Philippines is in a delicate situation. On the one 
hand, the EU is supporting access to affordable medicines in developing countries, 
but on the other hand, it has to assure competitiveness and access to growing 
markets for European industries. Regarding the rise of local and Indian generic drug 
producers on the Philippine market, the MAT faces a difficult task in approaching 
political decision-makers for compliance with the TRIPS Agreement’s provisions on 
the protection of IPR. What are the NTBs at stake for the pharmaceutical sector? 
The pharmaceutical market in the Philippines is highly concentrated on 
multinational companies which control 60% of the market.38 The access to medicines 
is a very salient issue for the Philippine government. Out of a population of 89 million, 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 A. Dür and D. De Bièvre, op.cit., p. 33. 
37 Ibid., p. 35. 
38 C .  C r u z ,  " T h e  P a t e n t  S y s t e m  a n d  t h e  Q u e s t  f o r  A f f o r d a b l e  M e d i c i n e s " ,  DLSU Business & 
Economics Review, vol. 18, no. 1, 2008, p. 65.  
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24 million do not enjoy access to medicine39 because of insufficient financial means 
spent on public healthcare and because of drug prices, which are “among the 
highest in Asia, if not in the world”.40 The small market base of only 15-20% of the 
population41 is one of the reasons alongside with “weak health-care systems, 
corruption, inadequate health insurance coverage, taxes and tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers to drug imports”.42  
In order to improve public health, the Philippine government ratified the so-
called ‘Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act’ of 2008. Generally speaking, this 
legislative act envisages the promotion of local drug production, while restricting the 
IPR of patent holders on R&D-based drugs. This Act thereby impedes the 
competitiveness of EU companies by allowing parallel importation of generic drugs 
on a broad scale. These parallel imports, especially from India, are even promoted 
by a state-owned agency (Philippine International Trade Centre) which issues more 
compulsory licenses without adequate compensation.43 With this legislation the 
enforcement of IPR has become a major concern for pharmaceutical companies 
exporting to the Philippines. 
The provisions of the Cheaper Medicine Act have not remained an issue for 
EU exporters and investors only. The MAT in the Philippines concerned with this 
legislation has a broad membership ranging from the European and four bilateral 
Chambers of Commerce (British, French, Spanish, German) to the Commission 
Delegation and EU member states having embassies on the ground. In general, the 
MAT has become very cohesive and the relations between its members are 
enhancing. Due to their cooperative conduct, the bargaining position improved vis-
à-vis the Philippine authorities and they are a contact point for the local authorities.44  
However, the MAT could not perform the role of an early warning alarm bell 
as it was only set up after the legislation on cheaper medicines was signed and 
ratified. This unfavourable timing together with the salience of the issue significantly 
constrains the potential range of actions taken by the MAT. It further limits the 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 64. 
40 Ibid., p. 65. 
41 K.M.A. Valdez, "Local drug manufacturers agree medicines law will bring prices down", The 
Manila Times, 3 February 2008, retrieved 12 April 2008, http://www. 
manilatimes.net/national/2008/feb/03/yehey/top_stories/20080203top2.html. 
42 Ibid. 
43 A. Pabico, "No cure for costly medicines? Draft law affirms patent rights of drug firms", The 
Manila Times, 12 May 2008, retrieved 12 April 2009, http://www. 
manilatimes.net/national/2008/may/12/yehey/top_stories/20080512top4.html. 
44 Results of the questionnaire from participants of the Philippine Market Access Team. 
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opportunities to focus more attentively on this barrier in Brussels as any interference in 
this issue might be considered as highly inappropriate and unethical. Consequently, 
participants of the network value the MAT’s information sharing function much more 
than attempts to get access to political decision-makers in the host country. But to 
what extent could and can the MAT in the Philippines still prove as influential? 
The change of legislation in favour of EU exporters and investors has clearly 
not been achieved. The issue as such was less prioritised in Brussels but a high priority 
for Philippine legislators.45 This implies that explicit action directed at the removal of 
this Cheaper Medicine Act can become a focal point of public attention. Moreover, 
the interference in this sensible issue could even be interpreted as unethical 
behaviour of the EU restraining the access to affordable medicines for the Philippine 
population. Consequently, the MAT has adopted a rather low profile or low-key 
approach in order to prevent any backfiring on the MAT’s efforts. This low profile and 
avoidance to present the EU and its business as wary free trade drivers implies that 
the MAT's information sharing function remained most important. 
It is very difficult for the MAT to gain influence on this highly prioritised issue in 
the Philippines. Therefore, the question can be raised whether the integration of 
foreign trade associations might balance this weakness. The precondition for an 
integration of other stakeholders is the consensus of MAT members on this issue. 
However, the MAT members disagree on the value attached to the involvement of 
local business or foreign trade associations.46 Concerning the involvement of foreign 
trade associations – be they US American or others – the members of the MAT agree 
that they would contribute with important resources thus making the whole MAT 
more successful. In contrast to that, the search for local allies remains complicated 
as the Philippine government tries to boost the local manufacturing capacities and 
Philippine stakeholders remain rather wary of the interests of foreign stakeholders.47  
By and large, the MAT in the Philippines has not been able to fulfil an early 
warning function. As it was created after the ratification of the Cheaper Medicine 
Act, the possibility only to react makes it particularly difficult to lift NTBs for EU 
companies. The social sensitivity and public attention directed at the issue of public 
health make the activities of the MAT a tightrope walking. Although the internal 
                                                 
45 Cf. Philippine News Agency, "PGMA signs Cheaper Medicines Act", 6 June 2008, retrieved 
24 April 2009, http://www.gov.ph/news/?=21129.  
46 Results of the questionnaire from participants of the Philippine Market Access Team. 
47 Comment in one questionnaire from participants of the Philippine MAT. 
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dimension of the network has contributed to increased information and resource 
exchange, the salience of the issue in the host country prevents the MAT from 
proceeding in a visible and active manner. Its low profile approach with the 
ambition of depoliticising the issue seems, however, a well-adapted and promising 
long-term approach to the specific conditions in the host country. 
 
4.2 The Market Access Team in Indonesia 
 
The economic growth potential of the Indonesian market for pharmaceutical 
products in the years to come attracts EU companies. However, their performance 
on the Indonesian market is limited by NTBs, especially the insufficient protection of 
intellectual property rights.  
There are various trade barriers facing the EU pharmaceutical companies. 
First, the lack of transparency and of unified simple procedures leads to profit losses 
because lengthy application procedures are required for a permission to sell the 
product on the Indonesian market. Furthermore, imitation products are sold on a 
large scale.48 Despite a legislative reform in 2000 targeting these problems, the 
investors in the pharmaceutical sector in Indonesia continue to encounter such 
obstacles to trade. The insufficient enforcement of the regulation especially hits EU 
investors “who rank first in the investment of pharmaceutical sectors”.49 In Indonesia 
the sales of counterfeit drugs are estimated to make up 10% of the value of the total 
market corresponding to 20 million US$.50  
A further problem related to IPR is that Indonesia still does not assure data 
exclusivity although according to Art. 39.3 TRIPS Agreement each state is obliged to 
enact appropriate domestic legislation. Another barrier for investors in the 
Indonesian pharmaceutical sector is the problem of caps on foreign investment. The 
Indonesian government has blacklisted foreign direct investment on a negative 
investment list in favour of the local industries, inter alia in the pharmaceutical 
sector.51 Finally, importers of pharmaceutical products face uncertain rules on the 
acceptance of their products. The Indonesian government tends to decide on the 
                                                 
48 Results of the questionnaire from participants of the Indonesian MAT. 
49 Price Waterhouse Coopers, Identification and Analysis of Trade Barriers in Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, Contract study for the European Commission, 3 
December 2001, p. 86.  
50 International Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Group (IPMG), Position Paper on Market 
Access Barrier and Intellectual Property Rights, 7 November 2006, p. 3.  
51 Results of the questionnaire from participants of the Indonesian MAT. 
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acceptance on a case-by-case basis, providing no guarantee for a sales market. All 
these NTBs are the issues of the sector-based MAT on pharmaceutical products in 
Indonesia. As a consequence, its agenda is very broad and requires a large range of 
trade diplomatic activities. 
Although the MAT only started in April 2008, the previously existing working 
group on pharmaceutical products organised by the European Trade Association 
has already provided some first experience for systematic coordination. This working 
group convened multinational companies, IPR consultants, embassies and other 
organisations. However, the Commission Delegation was not an active member of 
these meetings. The MAT shifted this working group on a new level with more 
members and additional resources. Under the MAT the Commission Delegation, EU 
Member States, one European Business Association and five to seven local 
companies and business associations come together. Furthermore, an international 
trade association with members from the EU, US, Singapore and Japan is involved in 
the work of the MAT.  
The advantage of the MAT is that it provides a platform for enhanced 
information sharing for multiple stakeholders. This platform helped to exchange 
different perspectives on the problems at stake and to spread within the network the 
analysis on potential WTO violations. The relations between the members of the 
network have improved with the result of more information sharing and an 
approximation of viewpoints. In contrast to the P h il ippine MA T,  however,  th is  MA T 
had already some experience of enhanced cooperation because of the working 
group organised by the European Trade Association. 
The diverse and complex array of trade barriers facing the pharmaceutical 
industry coincides with a weak Indonesian trade-policy capacity.52 In addition to 
that, recently founded vociferous trade unions and NGOs raise their voice for more 
protectionist policies overshadowing the less organised Indonesian export-oriented 
interests.53 In this clash of interests, only few people know the MAT and it adopted a 
low-profile strategy with the clear advantage of being able to tackle several issues in 
a constructive dialogue. However, it is also the low profile of the MAT which prevents 
the network from becoming a contact point and a provider of expertise for 
Indonesian officials. 
                                                 
52 OECD, Globalisation and Emerging Economies: Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and 
South Africa, op.cit., p. 141. 
53 Ibid., p. 135. 
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The stakeholders do not agree on the involvement of local companies or 
trade associations. Some stakeholders claim that they already had well-established 
contacts to Indonesian ministries, especially the Ministry of Health, without any local 
allies. Consequently, it is disputed between the members whether the Indonesian 
MAT shall be open to external stakeholders. While some trade associations do not 
agree on an ever more open network, the EU is a main driver for openness. It seems 
that in this case the basic assumption of hypothesis number four can neither be 
verified nor falsified as the disagreement on the involvement of local stakeholders 
prevents exactly these stakeholders from an efficient investment of their resources. 
To sum up, Indonesian trade barriers are numerous and often complex to 
prove. Like in the Philippines, the MAT does follow a low-profile approach in order to 
launch a constructive dialogue in which issue-linkage is possible. The experience of 
the previous working group has already provided some additional resources in terms 
of information and contacts. However, the MAT has not clearly defined its 
boundaries yet. Moreover, the MAT in Indonesia has a broad agenda and works in a 
complex trade environment. These circumstances make it difficult for the MAT to 
deliver clearly identifiable results.   
 
4.3 The Market Access Team in Japan 
 
In contrast to the other two case studies, Japan is the “second largest developed 
economy”,54 and already a key trading partner for the EU. Although the period of 
intense trade disputes of the 1980s and 1990s is over, especially NTBs prevent EU 
companies from expanding their market share on the Japanese market. These NTBs 
restrict, inter alia, the pharmaceutical, medical equipment and cosmetic industries 
as the approval process for drugs continues to be very slow and cumbersome.55  
The main issue for the MAT located in Japan has been vaccines. Foreign 
vaccine manufacturers account for only 2% on the Japanese market which is to 98% 
controlled by domestic manufacturers.56 This discrimination is further underlined by 
the fact that these foreign manufacturers account for 38% of the Japanese 
pharmaceutical market. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
                                                 
54 European Commission, EU-Japan Trade in Facts and Figures, Brussels, 2008, p. 1.  
55 European Commission, "The Voice of the Delegations: From the European Commission’s 
Delegation in Japan", Market Access Newsletter, issue 13, 31 October 2008, p. 4. 
56 Market Access Database, "Restricted Access to Japanese Vaccine Market", or: EFPIA, 
Japan Position Paper: The Vaccine Gap, p. 2.  
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Associations (EFPIA) even speaks of a “vaccine gap”57 endangering public health 
and making Japan an “exporter of infectious diseases to countries that have these 
diseases under better control through vaccination”.58  
The reason for this small market share of foreign vaccine producers lies 
foremost in the specific Japanese culture of preventive health care with very strict 
clinical guidelines.59 These guidelines mainly prevent any testing of products 
according to EU standards. A second barrier constitute the Japanese technical 
specifications which are different from internationally accepted WHO/EMEA/FDA 
guidelines. These differing guidelines also affect Japanese vaccine manufacturers 
from exporting their product. That is why these guidelines operate as a double NTB to 
both European as well as Japanese companies. Consequently, foreign exporters as 
well as Japanese exporters should theoretically be interested in a harmonisation of 
these regulatory standards. However, the liberalisation of the purchase and supply of 
vaccines for emergencies, as a third barrier, is strongly running against local 
industries’ interests. 
The establishment of a working group preceding the MAT dates back to mid-
October 2007. The initiative was strongly encouraged by the pharmaceutical 
industry, expressing clearly its demands and suggestions for the work of such an MAT 
in Japan. While some members of the MAT in the Philippines or Indonesia explicitly 
s u g g e s t e d  m o r e  a c t i v e  c o n s u l t a t i o n  o f  l o b b y i s t s  o f  t h e  p h a r m a c e u t i c a l  s e c t o r  i n  
Brussels, the EFPIA was one of the main drivers for a market access initiative in 
Japan.60 
The actors of the MAT Japan have been the Commission Delegation, EFPIA 
Japan, Member States and at a later stage US trade associations. However, the 
number of EU Member States participating was very limited despite the fact that 
most of the 27 countries have manufacturing capacities for vaccines on their 
territory.61 The MAT contributed to a significant increase of information sharing. This 
was especially an advantage for the EU and the Member States as EFPIA Japan was 
very well connected on the ground.  
                                                 
57 EFPIA, EFPIA Japan Position Paper: The Vaccine Gap, p. 1.  
58 Ibid., p. 2.  
59 Interview at EFPIA, Department External Trade, Brussels, 28 April 2009. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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Even though the initiative came from EFPIA, the Commission in Brussels was 
always very involved in the MAT’s activities. Although consultation mechanisms 
existed beforehand, the new market access initiative with the MAAC in Brussels and 
the MAT on the ground systematized the cooperation between different 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the issue of market access for EU vaccines in Japan 
became a personal issue for the then Commissioner Peter Mandelson who increased 
his effort spent on this case in Brussels and abroad.62  
One important asset of the Japanese MAT was not only the strong support 
from stakeholders in Brussels but also the point in time when the MAT was established. 
In contrast to the previous case studies, the MAT’s creation in Japan coincided with 
the launch of reforms of the public health sector by the Japanese government. The 
possibility to take influence was facilitated because of this reform agenda. 
Additional expertise to this reform agenda was easily accepted because some MAT 
members had well-established contacts to Japanese officials and especially with the 
Ministry of Health. Consequently, the MAT managed to link into the ongoing reform 
process. 
As the reform in the Japanese Ministry of Health progressed, three work 
streams were identified: clinical guidelines, technical specifications, flu and endemic 
preparedness. The influence of the MAT in each reform stream has varied. But 
especially in the stream of clinical guidelines, the MAT stakeholders have proven to 
be very influential. The reformed guidelines even indicate a shift from the preventive 
health care to the EU therapy approach which makes them comply to a high 
degree with already existing EU and international standards.63 However, the reform 
agenda in the field of technical regulations is progressing only slowly as additional 
support from Brussels is lacking. Finally, the monopoly on supply of vaccines for 
potential emergencies is persisting. This field is still closed to foreign manufacturers 
which underlines the minor influence of the MAT to date on this issue. 
By and large, the case study in Japan underlines the case of a – at least in 
partial issues – very influential MAT. Although the reform process is still ongoing, the 
high degree of compliance with EU standards proves the success of the MAT’s 
efforts. Critics might point out that the Japanese MAT has not provided a 
breakthrough in trade diplomacy. However, the MAT in Japan has demonstrated 
                                                 
62 European Commission, "The Voice of the Delegations: From the European Commission’s 
Delegation in Japan", op.cit., p. 5. 
63 Ibid. 
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how to use the full potential of information sharing and of exchanging resources in a 
more systematic way. With its cooperative conduct, it has become the contact 
point for Japanese officials for constructive and effective dialogue on trade matters.  
 
4.4 Main Findings of the Case Studies 
 
The MATs in the three case studies have provided a platform for increased 
information sharing and for better exchange and allocation of resources. The Market 
Access Team therefore becomes an advantageous framework for the stakeholders 
in third countries. In particular, the internal cohesiveness of the MAT members turned 
out to be a precondition for the MAT’s further action. Where previous multi-
stakeholder initiatives had already provided some experience of coordination and 
cooperation in the third countries, the creation of a cohesive network was facili-
tated. As a consequence, it can be assumed that effective cooperation is much 
harder established in the cases of either strong Member States’ interests or a large 
number of MAT stakeholders. 
Turning to the external dimension of the MATs, the issues on the Team’s 
agenda did not tend to become priorities in the Commission without the lobbying of 
concerned associations or federations in Brussels. The lobbying in Brussels is, however, 
facilitated when the main federation has direct subsidiaries in the respective host 
country. Otherwise, the voice of trade associations in the host country might run dry 
over the long distance between the EU and the third country. Nevertheless, the 
Commission delivered to all MATs legal expertise as valuable support. 
The salience of the issue in the host country has proven to be a decisive factor 
for the influence of MATs in all three case studies. Across the three cases, the 
salience of the public health issue gradually declined from the first to the last one. 
While in the Philippines the issue was very salient for citizens as well as for political 
decision-makers, the complexity of the NTBs in Indonesia made the issue less salient. 
In Japan, the issue was even subject to a reform process induced by the Japanese 
Ministry of Health. The importance of the issue in the Philippines obliged the MAT to 
keep a low profile and to avoid the impression of any interference. This low profile 
restricts the possibilities to provide expertise and to become a contact point for 
Philippine decision-makers. However, even the Philippine MAT cannot be considered 
as unsuccessful because all MAT members gain experience through regular 
information and coordination meetings and therefore provide best practices for 
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future action or MATs in other countries. A further correlation which can be 
established is that the more salient an issue in the host country, the less it is prioritised 
in Brussels which tries to refrain from a further politicisation of the issue at stake. The 
reason for this might be the explicit ambition of the Commission to deliver results to 
citizens, Member States and business. There might be a tendency to prioritise an issue 
only when there is a chance to deliver results. 
In addition to that, the MAT might also choose on a voluntary basis the low 
profile approach in the host country in order to avoid political attention to be drawn 
on their activities. When the issue at stake is very prominent, this additional attention 
from Brussels might render a constructive dialogue on the ground impossible. 
Therefore, the salience of an NTB tackled affects the MAT’s choice of a particular 
strategy. 
Finally, there turned out to be no agreement between the stakeholders on the 
added value of local or foreign trade associations joining the MAT. Generally 
speaking, the EU was keen on opening the MAT to other stakeholders, while trade 
associations were rather in favour of closing it, especially to the local companies or 
trade associations. Apparently, hypothesis number four has to be further specified: 
the more resources in terms of contacts and information the MAT members already 
have at their disposal in a host country, the less keen these members will be on 
sharing it with potential competitors. Furthermore, the EU as politico-economic actor 
has wider interests ranging from market access to good political contacts with the 
host country. As a consequence, the Commission Delegation follows a more political 
rationale and remains open to other stakeholders. In contrast to that, trade 
associations are applying a more economic rationale, thus being less keen to involve 
potential competitors. 
The comparison of the case studies’ results provides some additional policy 
advice. Pre-existing infrastructure (for instance working groups in trade associations) 
are an important link for the creation and activities of the MAT. The involvement of 
subsidiaries of federations in third countries or associations active in Brussels facilitates 
communication and helps to well establish the case in the Commission. Furthermore, 
the MAT should be created in important markets for important European industries at 
an early point in time as any reaction to already established legislation is much more 
difficult. Finally, the diverse attitudes towards the potential involvement of foreign 
and/or local trade associations underline the different rationales that actors in the 
  22 Anne Tiedemann 
 
MAT apply. Whereby the Commission Delegation has a more political rationale and 
tries to keep the MAT open to other stakeholders, other actors prefer a less inclusive 
MAT. Second, the actors having more resources at their disposal are also less open to 
the involvement of other stakeholders. Therefore, a low-profile approach, especially 
in countries with less stakeholders’ experience on cooperative trade policy, seems 
helpful in order to get to know the other stakeholders’ viewpoints and analysis of the 
situation as well as to start a constructive dialogue. 
 
4. Conclusions: Conditions of Success 
 
There is no straightforward answer to the question under which conditions the EU 
Market Access Teams can effectively remove foreign non-tariff barriers to trade. Yet, 
this study has revealed various factors, conditions and strategies affecting the MAT’s 
performance with regard to NTBs faced by the pharmaceutical industry in Asian 
markets. These factors concern both the internal and external dimensions of MATs. 
The first dimension designates the network itself and the relations between the actors 
gathered in the MAT. The second dimension looks specifically at the MAT’s links with 
the European Commission in Brussels and at the salience of the barrier targeted in 
the host country. Another aspect in the MAT’s external dimension is its cooperation 
with local trade associations and companies in the host countries or with the 
associations from other third countries. 
The results of the case studies illustrate that the internal cohesiveness between 
EU actors in third countries has increased as the MAT has brought trade associations, 
Member States’ embassies and EC delegations closer together. The information 
exchange between these actors has been significantly enhanced, and no internal 
veto player could be identified. This development brings with it advantages for all 
stakeholders as their combat against non-tariff barriers can build on positive 
synergies of their joint effort. It is furthermore a prerequisite for establishing long-term 
influence of the European MATs in the host countries.  
As became evident during the course of this study, the overall influence of 
MATs in third countries remains highly dependent on the prominence of the issue in 
the host country. Therefore, short-term success is genuinely hampered if the issue at 
stake is highly politicised. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry the issue 
becomes even more heated, as the majority of citizens are per se interested and 
concerned as they rely on their access to medicines. However, as seen in the 
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Japanese case study, if or when the inception of the MAT’s activities coincide with a 
reform process in the host country, it is more likely to bring about a certain degree of 
compliance with EU and international standards. By the same token, it underlines 
that the EU’s “trade power and power through trade”64 is unlikely to foster on its own 
domestic reforms in other countries.  
The case of the MAT in Japan in addition illustrates quite nicely that – contrary 
to the common perception that more lobbying creates more attention and political 
support – it does not always create a positive working environment for the MAT to 
thrive in. As a consequence, it can be the most convenient strategy to avoid more 
political attention being drawn on the MAT when the issue is very prominent and the 
MAT has only been created after the popular domestic legislation has been ratified 
in the third country.  
The MAT is able to correspond to the Market Access Strategy’s ambition to 
deliver results for multiple stakeholders, if its stakeholders act in a cohesive and 
cooperative manner and if the barrier tackled is salient in the EU while less salient in 
the respective third country. Furthermore, because of their decentralised working 
approach and their networking diplomacy mode, they indeed reflect very well 
today’s challenges for trade policy and therefore represent an adequate translation 
of the EU’s ambition to strengthen its competitiveness. As the official MATs have only 
recently been created, the stakeholders are still gathering experience with a view to 
best practices.  
In times of financial and economic crises the role of MATs is unlikely to diminish 
as the risk of protectionism is rising. The experiences gathered since 2007 can thereby 
be crucial to adapt and expand this EU instrument in order to maintain and promote 
market access.  
 
                                                 
64 S. Meunier and K. Nicolaidis, "The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power", Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 6, 2006, p. 912. 
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